Sovright requested that Least Authority perform a security audit of Argos, a recovery workspace for legacy ZecWallet Lite seeds. The application consists of a Rust-based core library, a command-line interface, and a graphical user interface built using Tauri. Its primary function is to scan the Zcash blockchain and perform large-scale
Anza Technology has requested that Least Authority perform a security audit of the BLS Signatures Crate. For this audit, we performed research, investigation, and review of the solana_bls_signatures and solana_bls12_381_syscall crates followed by issue reporting, along with mitigation and remediation instructions as outlined in this report. Our final audit report
We performed a security audit of LambdaClass’s Ethrex. Ethrex is a Rust implementation of the Ethereum protocol, designed to support ZK proofs and L2 execution. It includes a client with support for two different modes, L1 and L2, with the former working as a regular Ethereum client and the latter
White Noise is an encrypted group chat application implementing the Marmot protocol. The Marmot protocol combines the MLS (Messaging Layer Security) protocol with Nostr’s decentralized network to provide private group messaging that does not rely on centralized servers. whitenoise-rs is the Rust backend for White Noise client applications. It leverages
Espresso has requested that we perform a security audit of its smart-contract layer, focusing on the Solidity contracts that verify Nitro Trusted Execution Environment (TEE) attestations and enforce batch authentication for Optimism integration. Our final audit report was completed on April 1, 2026. To read the full report, including our
Marmot combines the MLS (Messaging Layer Service) Protocol with Nostr’s decentralized network to provide private group messaging without relying on centralized servers or legacy identity systems. MDK is the Marmot Development Kit and consists of four crates. White Noise is the Rust backend of the Flutter application, and the whitenoise
We performed a security audit of TACEO’s OPRF Noir circuits within their OPRF service, which provides publicly verifiable, privacy-preserving nullifiers via a verifiable threshold OPRF (Oblivious Pseudorandom Function). Our final audit report was completed on January 26, 2026. To read the full report, including our findings, click here: Report
We performed a security audit of the upgraded version of TACEO’s Circom circuits used in their Nullifier Oracle service, which implements publicly verifiable, privacy-preserving nullifiers through a verifiable threshold OPRF (Oblivious Pseudorandom Function). Our final audit report was completed on January 26, 2026. To read the full report, including our